Working Papers
- Estimation of Games under No Regret: Structural Econometrics for AI (with Lorenzo Magnolfi)
– R&R at the Journal of Political Economy
– Accepted for presentation at EC 2025
– Recipient of the NET Institute Summer Grant 2024 - The Choices of Others: An Experiment on Social Search (with Maria Bigoni, Michela Boldrini, and Emanuele Tarantino)
– R&R at Games and Economic Behavior - Information Design with Frame Choice (with Yulia Evsyukova and Federico Innocenti)
– R&R at the European Economic Review (Special Issue in Memory of Nora Szech) - A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment (with Takuro Yamashita)
– Accepted for presentation at EC 2022
– New version coming soon - Learning while Bargaining: Experimentation and Coasean Dynamics [slides]
– Best Graduate Paper Award at the 2018 Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications
– Finalist for the LAGV Prize at ASSET 2018 - Collective Search in Networks
– Accepted for presentation at WINE 2023 - Identification in Search Models with Social Information (with Emanuele Tarantino)
– New version coming soon - Pandora’s Box Problem with Correlations: Some Results for the Case of Stochastic Dominance (with Matteo Bizzarri)
Selected Work in Progress
- Robust Identification in Repeated Games: An Empirical Approach to Algorithmic Competition (with Antonio Cozzolino, Cristina Gualdani, Ivan Gufler, and Lorenzo Magnolfi)
– Recipient of the NET Institute Summer Grant 2025 - Identification and Inference in Games: Sensitivity and Robustness with Respect to Information Structures (with Cristina Gualdani and Takuro Yamashita)
Publications in Refereed Conference Proceedings (Economics & Computer Science)
- Estimation of Games under No Regret: Structural Econometrics for AI (with Lorenzo Magnolfi)
Extended abstract in the Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation: EC 2025 - Collective Search in Networks
Extended abstract in the Proceedings of the 19th Conference on Web and Internet Economics: WINE 2023 - A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment (with Takuro Yamashita)
Extended abstract in the Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation: EC 2022